When the Judge Met P: The Rules of Engagement in the Court of Protection and the Parallel Universe of Children Meeting Judges in the Family Court by Case, PJ
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Introduction 
In 2015 Justice Peter Jackson (as he then was), a Court of Protection (‘CoP’) judge, decided whether 
it would be lawful to proceed with a life-saving leg amputation against the wishes of the patient (Mr 
B). Mr B was ‘proud’ and ‘fiercely independent’ and had told the judge that he was not afraid of 
dying - the angels had already told him he would be going to heaven.
1
 Peter Jackson J spoke of 
meeting Mr B in the following terms: 
‘given the momentous consequences of the decision either way, I did not feel able to 
reach a conclusion without meeting Mr B myself. There were two excellent recent 
reports of discussions with him, but there is no substitute for a face-to-face meeting 
where the patient would like it to happen’. 2 
As Wye Valley illustrates, the CoP’s jurisdiction under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) is one of 
‘profound importance.’3 Life changing ‘health and welfare’ decisions are made regarding whether P 
has the capacity to make his or her own decisions on matters as transformative as whether they should 
live in the family home or in residential care, and whether life sustaining treatment should be 
continued or withdrawn. Despite the words of the judge set out above, and exhortations from other 
CoP judges encouraging their contemporaries to meet with P
4
, this article will show that such 
meetings have been rare and that the direct voice of P has apparently often been absent from these life 
changing judgments. Amendments to the CoP Rules in 2015 signal a bold attempt to focus attention 
on the participation of those at the centre of hearings
5
, but as with the parallel guidance offered to 
judges meeting children, the option of a meeting with the judge outside the courtroom is framed as a 
matter of ‘discretion’.6   
Although P being able to tell their story directly to the decision maker (referred to here as ‘direct 
engagement’) may occur in the context of P either giving ‘information’ or ‘evidence’ to the court, or 
                                                          
1
 Wye Valley NHS Trust v B [2015] EWCOP 60, [21] and [37]. 
2
 Ibid [18].  
3
 A Local Authority v AB [2016] EWCOP 41, [5]. 
4
 Re CD [2015] EWCOP 74 at [31] and Re M [2013] EWCOP 3456, [42]. 
5
 CoP Amendment Rules 2015 (SI 548/2015) inserting a new Rule 3A into the CoP Rules 2007. 
6
 See A. Daly making this point eloquently in the case of children in Children, Autonomy and the Courts: Beyond the Right to 
be Heard. (Brill, 2018) chapter 4 , 199.  
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in the specific context of P meeting and talking to the judge, it is the latter which is the main focus of 
this paper.
7
 An integrated approach to the scrutiny of direct engagement is adopted, observing practice 
through the lens of published CoP judgments, whilst also cross-referencing the far more developed 
literature and jurisprudence on judges meeting the child in Family Court proceedings to illuminate 
some of the issues. What emerges from this analysis is: a) uncertainty regarding the extent to which 
rules developed in the Family Court apply to the adult jurisdiction of the CoP; and b) mixed messages 
in judicial narratives in terms of whether an impermeable barrier can and ought to be maintained 
between a  meeting with P and the ‘grounds’ for the decision.  
After first exploring the value of direct engagement and then examining its endorsement (or 
otherwise) in the parallel jurisdictions of the Family Court and CoP, this paper examines the 
prevalence of direct engagement in the broad sense (i.e. including giving evidence or information in 
person or meeting with the judge) in the CoP, before offering a closer textual analysis of CoP 
judgments where the judge has met with P, or this particular option has been discussed. The 
concluding discussion argues that judges and practitioners should not too readily assume that the 
Family Court model’s approach to hearing from children, which does not recognise presumptions in 
favour of direct engagement, is appropriate or desirable when it comes to judges meeting with P.  
1. THE VALUE OF ‘DIRECT ENGAGEMENT’: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE IN 
THE COP? 
The benefits of the subject of proceedings engaging directly with the court resonate strongly with 
therapeutic jurisprudence ideals. The ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’(TJ)  movement, founded by Bruce 
Winick and David Wexler almost 30 years ago
8
, produced a body of literature of galactic proportions 
with an international following. Its aim was to develop awareness of, and make explicit, the 
therapeutic contributions of law and legal procedures. The research it generated emphasises the harms 
                                                          
7
 Rather than a broader view of participation which includes what might be called ‘indirect engagement’ or engagement at 
a distance, e.g.‘representation’ of P through lawyers, intermediaries, etc. - see, e.g. the excellent report by L. Series et al, 
The Participation of P in Welfare Cases in the Court of Protection. (2017) (available at http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wccop/new-
research-report-the-participation-of-p-in-welfare-cases-in-the-court-of-protection/) which examines many different 
elements of ‘participation.’ 
8
 D. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Law as a Therapeutic Agent (Carolina Academic Press, 1991) and D. Wexler and 
B. J. Winick, Judging in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in Therapeutic Jurisprudence (Carolina Academic Press, 1996).  
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caused by exclusion and alienation by legal processes and the therapeutic benefits of ‘inclusion, being 
given a meaningful voice and being treated as integral’ to the proceedings.9   
Amy Ronner’s three ‘V’s (‘voice’, ‘validation’ and ‘voluntariness’) as hallmarks of therapeutic 
judging have become a subframe of reference within TJ, and are adapted for the purposes of this 
analysis.
10
 According to Ronner, ‘voice’ entails the opportunity to tell one’s story to the decision 
maker.
11
 Voice can, of course, be achieved through representation, but there is growing recognition of 
the importance of direct engagement with the decision maker, and a preference for the voice of the 
subject being heard ‘directly’ can be identified in TJ work.12 Direct engagement might be preferred to, 
or at least regarded as a valuable addition to, participation which is exclusively at a distance (i.e. 
through a representative) for a number of reasons. In both child and adult jurisdictions, concerns have 
been expressed that the professional relaying of the subject’s wishes and feelings offers a ‘filtered’ 
and sometimes ‘misinterpreted’ account.13 The Court of Appeal in Re W referred to the child’s 
account being ‘finessed away’ by the CAFCASS officer’s ‘own analysis.’14 Hunter, however, 
staunchly critiques the idea that meeting the child somehow provides the judge with an authentic, 
unfiltered account.
15
 Indeed, in Wye Valley itself the judge remarked that a nurse had been present and 
‘had been invaluable in helping him understand everything Mr B wanted to say.’16 Even this meeting 
was therefore not ‘unfiltered,’ and as such meetings take place against the background of the evidence 
presented in court, there is no real sense of judges seeing P in cognitive isolation from the rest of the 
case. But recognising that nothing is ‘unfiltered’ or uncontaminated by other influences does not of 
itself negate the added value of these meetings, which can contextualise, ‘supplement and 
                                                          
9
 I. Freckleton, ‘Death Investigation, the coroner and therapeutic jurisprudence.’ (2007) 15 Journal of Law and Medicine 1.  
10
 A. Ronner, ‘Songs of Voice, Validation and Voluntary Participation.’ (2002) 71 Uni Cin L Rev 89 at 95 and  A. Ronner, ‘The 
Learned Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome.’ 
(2008) 24 Touro L Rev 601 at 628. 
11
 K. Burke, ‘Just what made drug courts successful?’ (2008) 36 New England Journal on Criminal and Civil Confinement 39 
at 54. 
12
 S. Leben, ‘Thoughts on the Judge’s Written Work.’ (2014) published proceedings of American Judges Association 
conference available at  amjudges.org/conferences/2014Annual/ConferenceMaterials/ZQ-Leben (accessed 2.7.18). 
13
 P. Parkinson and J. Cashmore, ‘Judicial Conversations with Children (chapter 7)’ in The Voice of a Child in Family Law 
Disputes (OUP, 2008) at 162 and see also J. Caldwell, ‘Common law judges and judicial interviewing.’ (2011) 23 CFLQ 41. 
14
 Re W [2008] EWCA Civ 538 at [28-29]. 
15
 R. Hunter, ‘Close Encounters of a Judicial Kind.’ (2007) 19 CFLQ 204. 
16
 Wye Valley (n1) [18]. 
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illuminate’17 the evidence before the court. The importance of the subject of proceedings being able to 
tell their story directly to the decision maker is now reflected in Article 6 jurisprudence which has 
generated what Lucy Series calls a rule of ‘personal presence.’18 
Ronner’s second ‘V’ of ‘validation,’ entails that subjects should feel listened to, for if they do, they 
are more likely to feel that they have truly participated in the decision and prosper.
19
 ‘Listening’ to P 
requires courts to emphasise a subjective focus on [P’s] ‘understanding of events or actions’ and seek 
to ‘listen to and understand [P’s] view of the world’.20 The practice of meeting P itself conveys 
positive validating messages, for example, that the judge is sufficiently interested in the person, that 
the job of making the decision is so important that it cannot be delegated and that the judge is not 
willing to simply ‘rubber stamp’ expert reports.21 Encounters between the judge and P (where they 
happen) are frequently reflected in ritualised validatory narratives. The judge may report on P’s 
capacity to concentrate, their courteousness,
22
 articulateness
23
 and intelligence. The subject of 
proceedings in Lincolnshire CC v K was described as having: ‘…a good command of language 
structure and vocabulary and …pleasant interpersonal skills. She also demonstrated throughout the 
hearing a great degree of concentration and attention.’24 In Re Z the judge commented on P’s attire 
(‘[S]he was suitably and smartly dressed’), her demeanour (she ‘gave evidence in a calm and 
measured way’) and her believability (‘[g]iven her learning difficulties, I was surprised by the 
sophistication of some of her answers, although acknowledge that this may have been in part 
attributable to her having learned certain phrases’).25 
                                                          
17
Ibid. 
18
 L. Series, Briefing Paper: The Participation of the Relevant Person in Court of Protection Proceedings. (September 2014). 
In a later judgment from 2016, the ECtHR clearly placed a premium on the opportunity to be heard in person, compared to 
representation by others in fulfilment of these rights: See A N v Lithuania (2016) ECHR at [90]: ‘…it is essential that the 
person concerned should have access to court and the opportunity to be heard either in person or, where necessary, 
through some form of representation.’ 
19
 Ronner (n.10).  
20
 A. Freiberg, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Australia: paradigm shift or pragmatic incrementalism’ (2002) 20(2) Law in 
Context 6, 16.  
21
 F. Raitt, ‘Hearing children in family law proceedings: can judges make a difference?’ (2007) 19 CFLQ 204 and Sir Nicholas 
Wilson, ‘The Ears of the Child in Family Proceedings,’ Hershman/Levy Memorial Lecture 2007 (available at 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/.../wilsonlj-hershman-levy-memorial.pdf) (accessed 2.7.18). 
22
 E.g. Y County Council v ZZ [2012] EWCOP B34, [3]. 
23
 A Local Authority v TZ [2013] EWCOP 2322, [45].  
24
 [2016] EWCOP 4, [10].  
25
 Ibid [53].  
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Such statements verify the probative value of P’s contributions and credibility as a witness, but their 
purpose clearly extends beyond these forensic concerns. The same rhetoric features in cases where the 
judge encounters P, but P is not giving information or evidence. For example, ‘PB is likeable, highly 
intelligent, sophisticated and articulate, well-read and knowledgeable... and ‘It is obvious to me from 
all that I have read and heard as well as from the meeting that PB’s intellectual understanding is at a 
high level’.26 Similarly, in another case of a judge simply meeting with the patient, P was described as 
‘engaging and polite’…..’articulate’ and ‘amusing’….’She listened carefully to questions and 
answered them equally carefully.’27 Such validating judicial narratives ratify P’s participation in the 
process, signalling that she is being listened to and confirming that P should feel entitled and not ‘out 
of place’ in the courtroom. Voice is not always accompanied by validation, however. In GW v A Local 
Authority, P later appealed the decision on the grounds that, despite her evidence being given in 
person over many hours and being extensively cross examined, the judgment barely mentioned her 
evidence.
28
  
In Ronner’s formulation, ‘voluntariness’ (the third ‘V’) is a feeling which often emerges from the 
experience of voice and validation in court proceedings.
29
 But something seems to be missing from 
this account – surely Ronner did not intend to imply that superficial, ritualistic engagement with P 
provides sufficient fulfilment of the TJ agenda. A preferable interpretation would be to read 
‘voluntariness’ as having independent significance, as requiring some form of ‘weight’ or 
‘influence’30 to be attached to P’s views, or as  Winick advocates in another context, ‘honouring [P’s] 
choice where possible.’31 Recognising direct engagement as having not just symbolic or expressive 
                                                          
26
 Norfolk CC v PB [2014] EWCOP 14, [44] and [45]. 
27
 Re CD [2015] EWCOP 74, [31].  
28
 [2014] EWCOP 20. Her appeal was unsuccessful, although the appeal judgment recognised that the reference to this 
evidence was ‘undoubtedly…brief,’ [41]. 
29
 (n.10), 95. 
30
 On the need for ‘influence’ see Laura Lundy’s work on Article 12 of the CRC ‘Voice is not Enough’ (2007) 33(6) British 
Educational Research Journal 927, 933, although in the context of the child’s ‘right to be heard’ rather than TJ. 
31
 B.J. Winick, ‘Competency to consent’ (1991) 28 Houston Law Review 15, 46-53. 
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significance, but also instrumental force, speaks to the close relationship between TJ and procedural 
justice.
32 
Wye Valley and the Functions of a Meeting with the Judge: Embracing the 3 ‘Vs’?  
The judgment in Wye Valley referred to at the outset of this paper, provides the only detailed judicial 
exposition of the functions of a meeting between the judge and P, and it resonates closely with TJ 
concerns. P had been found to lack capacity to decide whether the recommended amputation should 
go ahead. Justice Peter Jackson met with him in his hospital room, largely to ascertain his wishes and 
preferences as part of assessing his ‘best interests.’ The resulting judgment reflected on the value of 
such meetings and recognised, in effect, a triangulation of therapeutic benefits but also contained 
some mixed messages on ‘voluntariness,’ that is, whether P’s voice in this context could make a 
difference to the decision.  
First, Justice Peter Jackson observed that the meeting gave the judge a ‘deeper understanding’ of P’s 
view of the world.
33
 In developing the judge’s understanding, this might imply that P’s voice may 
have instrumental value, in that it could potentially alter the outcome.  Secondly, the judge thought 
that these meetings could help P
34
, by giving him the opportunity to get his voice across, but also in 
giving him a better understanding of the process and ‘helping him to make sense of the outcome.’35  
Finally, these meetings were helpful for those caring for P - giving P the opportunity to be heard 
directly could reduce strain in the therapeutic relationship.
36
 These aspects of the judgment echo the 
concerns of TJ with the emotional and psychological impact on P of decision making, but recognise 
extended therapeutic impact to those close to P who may also be adversely affected psychologically 
                                                          
32
 In particular the seminal work of T. Tyler and E. Lind, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice. (Springer, 1988). On the 
relationship between TJ and procedural justice, see e.g. D. Wexler, ‘Time for a Robust Reciprocal Relationship Between 
Procedural Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (2007) 44 Court Review 78. 
33
 Wye Valley (n1), [18]. 
34
 ibid. 
35
 The concern with making P ‘feel’ that they are participating, echoes the guidance for judges meeting children where the 
purposes of such meetings are stated as being ‘to enable the child to gain some understanding of what is going on, and to 
be reassured that the judge has understood him/her. Guidelines for Judges Meeting Children [2010] 2 FLR 1872, [5].  
36
 (n1), [18].  
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by the law’s incursion into decision making.37 Only the first of the three functions appears to 
recognise that P’s voice, as expressed in his meeting with the judge, can make a difference. 
Nevertheless, the Wye Valley judgment can be read as an enthusiastic endorsement of the three ‘Vs’ 
embedded in TJ. Space was created to hear P’s ‘view of the world’ (voice and validation), but 
critically, the meeting ultimately ‘honoured P’s choices’, steering the judge away from the expert 
view that the amputation should proceed (voluntariness).
38
 As will become clear, such meetings have 
been rare and uncertainty regarding whether Family Court practices should be transplanted to the CoP 
may have been a factor impeding their use. 
 
2. PARALLEL UNIVERSES: THE PROXIMATE JURISDICTIONS OF THE 
FAMILY COURT AND THE COP 
In the context of P’s participation in CoP cases, Justice Rogers refers to the potential for ‘helpful 
parallels’ to be drawn with Children Act proceedings in the Family Court.39 When CoP judges find 
themselves with no clear steer on how to deal with a particular issue, they not infrequently reach 
across to Family Court judgments for guidance.
40
 This cross-pollenation is unsurprising, as there are 
many ways in which the Family Court deciding Children Act 1989 cases, and the CoP deciding cases 
under the MCA, operate in parallel universes. Both statutes govern jurisdictions requiring the court to 
make decisions advancing the child’s welfare/P’s best interests,41 and in both cases the subject’s 
‘ascertainable wishes and feelings’ are a relevant (although not determinate) factor in determining 
those best interests.
42
 Added to these broad parities, judges in the CoP frequently have substantial 
experience of sitting on cases involving children, (including Sir James Munby who has served as 
President of both the CoP and the Family Division simultaneously) and the lawyers appearing in court 
                                                          
37
 The therapeutic value of the CoP’s work to families of P has been recognised in withdrawal of life sustaining treatment 
cases: S. Halliday et al, ‘An Assessment of the Court’s Role in Withdrawing Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration from 
Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State.’ (2015) 23(4) Med L Rev 556. 
38
 (n1), evidence of Dr Glover at [38]. 
39
 A Local Authority v AB (n3), [49].  
40
 E.g. LBX v TT [2014] EWCOP 24, [39] and Re AG [2015] EWCOP 78, [26] adapting guidelines from Re W [2008] EWHC 1188 
on when to hold finding of fact hearings.  
41
 S.1(3) CA 1989 and s.1(5) and s.4 of the MCA 2005.  
42
 S.1(3)(a) CA 1989 and s.4(6) MCA.  
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may also have substantial family law experience.
43
 In these proximate jurisdictions which share 
personnel on both sides of the bench, some transplanting of rules is inevitable, but whilst transplanting 
may be ‘socially easy,’44 it can create the risk that problematic approaches are mirrored, and thereby 
mutually reinforced.  
a) Direct engagement in the Family Court 
Much of the momentum for encouraging judges to meet the child in Family Court cases has been 
generated under the auspices of the child’s ‘right to be heard’ in Article 12 of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’). Article 12 states that the child ‘shall be provided with the opportunity 
to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child.’45 Although it does not 
mandate hearing from the child directly
46
, UN General Comment No. 12 recommends that, where 
possible, children should have the ‘opportunity’ to be heard directly in proceedings.47 Sir James 
Munby, speaking extra judicially, regarded Article 12 as ‘driving thinking’ in this area and advocated 
children being made to feel like ‘participants’ rather than ‘spectators’.48  
Notwithstanding Article 12, Family Court jurisprudence has, thus far, avoided recognising 
presumptions in favour of direct engagement with the child. Until recently, the prevalent judicial 
stance with respect to children was that the trauma inflicted by participating in the court process 
would likely be damaging, and this justified a presumption that it was ‘undesirable’ for children to 
give evidence.
49
 In the pivotal Supreme Court case of Re W, Baroness Hale asserted that this position 
could no longer be justified; the issue of whether a child should give evidence to the court should be 
subject to a balancing exercise, weighing what was to be gained as against the risk of harm to the 
                                                          
43
 E.g. see A Local Authority v AB (n3), [6].  
44
 See P. Legrand’s work on legal transplanting in comparative law: ‘The impossibility of legal transplants’ (1997) 4 MJ 111 
and his reference at 112 to A. Watson, Legal Transplants 2
nd
 ed. (University of Georgia Press, 1993). 
45
 See also Article 11(2) of Brussels II Regulation ‘when applying Articles 12 and 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention it shall be 
ensured that the child is given the opportunity to be heard during the proceedings unless this appears inappropriate having 
regard to his or her age or degree of maturity.’  
46
 The child must be heard ‘either directly, or through a representative or appropriate body’ (Article 12).  
47
 (2009 at [35] – emphasis added). And see Thorpe LJ in Re G [2010] EWCA Civ 1232, [15] preferring the judge to hear 
directly from the child ‘in carefully arranged conditions’. A meeting with the judge provides one means of offering this 
opportunity, but it may also be fulfilled by the child giving evidence in the case.  
48
 Sir James Munby, Unheard voices. (annual lecture of The Wales Observatory on Human Rights of Children and Young 
People, 2015) (accessible at https://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/Sir James Munby Annual lecture 2015, accessed 2.7.18).  
49
[2010] UKSC 12, [22]. See also Re W (secure accommodation) [1994] 2 FLR 1092 per Ewbank J, ‘…the court should always 
bear in mind that attendance in court is likely to be harmful to the child.’ (emphasis added).   
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child.
50
 This shift did not, however, equate to a presumption in favour of giving evidence, even if the 
child had expressed the wish to do so
51
 – such wishes were merely to be taken into account in the 
balancing exercise.
52
 The current Guidance for Judges Meeting Children mirrors Re W’s non-
presumptive model. It leaves the matter of whether the meeting happens in the hands of the judge and 
there is no explicit presumption that it should happen in every case where it is desired.
53
  
Another distinctive factor of Family Court practice is that it draws an uncompromising distinction 
between different forms of direct engagement. Where additional information emerges from a 
‘meeting’ between the judge and a child (as opposed to the giving of ‘evidence’), the information 
cannot be given any weight. This is because a ‘meeting’ without the lawyers being present is regarded 
as putting fundamental adversarial norms at risk, namely that the case should be decided on the 
‘evidence,’ which must be presented in open court, and that the parties should be given the 
opportunity to test that evidence by way of cross-examination.
54
 The Family Court maintains a robust 
distinction between ‘forensic’ and ‘non-forensic’ purposes, with private meetings between the judge 
and the child being confined to the latter. The forensic/non-forensic distinction is a persistent theme in 
guidance and jurisprudence concerning family proceedings. The Guidance for Judges Meeting 
Children,
55
 for example, includes the emphatic
56
 reminder that: 
‘…the child’s meeting with the judge is not for the purpose of gathering evidence …The 
purpose is to enable the child to gain some understanding of what is going on and to be 
reassured that the Judge has understood him/her.’57  
This distinction was reaffirmed as a ‘firm line’ by the Court of Appeal,58 and judges have been 
                                                          
50
 Re W (n49) [26]-[28] per Baroness Hale. 
51
 Followed in Re R (Children) which found in favour of the child who wished to give evidence being permitted to do so, but 
on the basis of a balancing exercise with no presumptive starting point. [2015] EWCA Civ 167. Cf P-S (Children) [2013] 
EWCA Civ 223, [37]. 
52
 Re W (n49), [26]. 
53
 [2010] 2 FLR 1872. A wish to meet the judge should be communicated to the judge, but representations may be made as 
to whether this is appropriate. It should be noted that there is still resistance to judges meeting children without relevant 
training (see Hunter (n15) and P. Tapp, ‘Judges are humans too: conversation between the judge and a child as a means of 
giving effect to section 6 of the Care of Children Act 2004’ [1996] New Zealand Law Review 35), but exploring this issue is 
outside the scope of this article. 
54
 E.g. MB v Surrey CC [2017] EWCOP B27, [8]: ‘…the Court is the servant of the evidence that is provided by the parties.’   
55
(n53). These were supplemented by Guidelines in Relation to Children Giving Evidence in Family Proceedings in 2012.  
56
 In the terms ‘it cannot be stressed too often that…’ 
57
 At [5], emphasis added. 
 11 | P a g e  
 
warned to take great care to avoid ‘contamination’ of the proceedings in this context.59 In the leading 
case of Re KP Mrs Justice Parker’s decision was successfully appealed on the grounds that she had 
treated her meeting with the child in the case as ‘part of the evidence’.60 The judge had departed from 
the guidelines as evidenced by the fact that she referred to what the child had said as akin to 
‘representations’ or ‘submissions’, and the transcript of the meeting showed that she had asked no less 
than 87 questions during the meeting.
61
 It was not these departures which were crucial in overturning 
the judge’s decision, but rather the finding that the judge had allowed this meeting to become 
‘pivotal’62 to her decision and had been the reason for rejecting the CAFCASS officer’s evidence on 
the child’s objections to a return to Malta with her father.  
 
This distinction between ‘non-forensic’ communication and ‘evidence gathering’ has generated a 
number of appellate decisions (see below), and it is entirely plausible that this would deter judges 
from meeting the child lest they stray into this forbidden territory. These meetings may therefore 
afford voice and validation, but any sense of voluntariness is absent if there is no right or presumption 
in favour of meeting the judge if the child wishes it, and if things told to the decision maker cannot 
bear any weight.  
 
b) Direct engagement and the ‘two stages’ of CoP proceedings 
In the CoP, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’) has played a 
similar role to the CRC in galvanising efforts to rethink how P’s voice might be heard. Specifically, 
Article 13  provides that people with disabilities should have ‘effective access to justice…on an equal 
basis with others’ and requires states to provide ‘procedural and age appropriate accommodation to 
facilitate their effective role as direct and indirect participants.’ The UN Committee on the CRPD has 
not released a General Comment on Article 13, but it is likely that modes of direct participation would 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
58
 Re KP [2014] EWCA Civ 554, [50]. 
59
 Ibid [57].  
60
Ibid.  
61
 And see Baroness Hale’s remark that Justice Parker was a ‘formidable cross-examiner…It cannot have been a pleasant 
experience for the child’: Are we nearly there yet? (Association of Lawyers for Children Conference, 2015) (p.13).  
62
 (n58), [59]. 
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be preferred in the context of persons with disabilities too.
63
 As Perlin has argued, embracing the 
values of TJ, with its emphasis on voice and participation can be viewed as an important preliminary 
step towards meaningful enforcement of the CRPD.
64
 
There are commonly two stages to health and welfare proceedings
65
 in the CoP, either of which might 
feature direct engagement. The first of these is the ‘jurisdictional stage,’ where the court determines 
whether P lacks decision making capacity on a particular issue or set of issues. Only if a 
determination of incapacity is made, does the court have jurisdiction to make a decision on behalf of 
that person, applying the ‘best interests’ criteria set out in s.4 of the MCA.66  
The gateway concept of mental ‘capacity’ and direct engagement 
It goes without saying that a determination that someone lacks capacity can deprive them of rights 
(such as the right to refuse treatment, or to choose where to live), whilst also being loaded with 
substantial anti-therapeutic effects, potentially leaving them feeling stigmatised, powerless and 
deprived of their personhood and dignity.
67
 This is starkly captured in GW v A Local Authority & 
Anor, where the decision on P’s capacity would determine whether she could leave her 
accommodation and walk into town unescorted, and was described as: "… a litmus test on who she is 
and on the progress of her condition, the answer to which goes right to the core of her identity and 
lifestyle.”68 Direct engagement with the court in the form of P giving evidence has, in rare cases, been 
so transformative to the case that it has resulted in the judge making a decision which departed from 
the preponderance of expert evidence on capacity, or even resulted in unanimous expert evidence on 
P’s capacity being rejected altogether. In an earlier study the author surveyed 66 CoP judgments 
which examined capacity in detail and found just three of these in which the judge went against a 
consensus of expert evidence on capacity. It is no coincidence that in each of these cases, P had given 
                                                          
63
 Although the Convention is not legally binding, the UK is a signatory which signals a commitment to developing our 
frameworks so as to better protect these important Convention rights: Birmingham City Council v Burnip [2012] EWCA Civ 
629, [19-22]. 
64
 M. Perlin, ‘Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind’ (2013) Penn St L Rev 1159 at 1189. 
65
 This analysis focuses on ‘health and welfare’ cases, rather than property and financial affairs cases, largely because the 
latter are dealt with very differently (direct engagement is even more rare) and are not easily compared with the 
health/welfare cases. 
66
 Per Charles J in V v Associated Newspapers [2016] EWCOP 21, [55]. 
67
 ibid.  
68
 [2014] EWCOP 20. 
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oral evidence in court on her own capacity.
69
 These are stark examples of direct engagement 
providing voice, validation and, ultimately, voluntariness (changing the outcome of the case), whilst 
also providing a valuable check on expert opinion. 
Participatory ‘best interests’ decision making  
Where the CoP finds that P lacks capacity on the matter at hand, decisions as to P’s future, must be 
decided in accordance with P’s ‘best interests’70 and P’s own wishes, feelings, beliefs and values are 
stipulated as relevant factors in identifying those best interests.
71
 When reflecting on his private
72
 
meeting with Mr B, Justice Peter Jackson appeared to explain the meeting as an application of the 
participatory provisions of s.4(4) of the MCA
73
 which requires that ‘so far as reasonably practicable, P 
must be permitted and encouraged to participate in any decision affecting him,’ which of course 
includes decisions as to what is in P’s best interests. Prior to the MCA it was common for P’s wishes 
and feelings not to feature explicitly in the best interests assessment at all,
74
 a sign perhaps that P was 
not routinely afforded any kind of voice. The CRPD edict that P’s will and preferences should be 
‘respected,’75 has resulted in closer attention to the issue, although so far falling short of ‘honouring 
[P’s] wishes where possible’.76  
Alongside these developments, Lady Hale’s obiter in Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation 
Trust v James that the ‘whole point’ of the best interests test was to consider matters from P’s ‘point 
of view’77 has augmented the elevated status of wishes and feelings in the best interests equation. 
Lady Hale’s encouragement to look at matters from P’s vantage point has visibly cascaded down to 
                                                          
69
 See CC v KK [2012] EWCOP 2136, Re SB [2013] EWCOP 1417 and Re Z [2016] EWCOP 4 discussed in P. Case, ‘Negotiating 
Domains of Mental Capacity: Clinical Judgment or Judicial Diagnosis?’ (2016) 16 MLI 174. 
70
 S.1(5) MCA 2005. 
71
 S.4(6) MCA 2005.  
72
 The judge in the presence of the judge’s clerk and a nurse. 
73
 (n1), [19]. 
74
 E.g. Re A [2000] 1 FCR 193 and see M. Donnelly, ‘Best Interests, Patient Participation and the Mental Capacity Act 2005’ 
(2009) 17 Med L Rev 1.  
75
 Article 12(4).  
76
 Winick (n31). See now Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill 2018, cl.8, amending s.4 to require ‘particular weight’ to P’s 
wishes and feelings where they have been ascertained (despite much support for a presumption in favour of P’s wishes 
and feelings determining the outcome – see A Ruck Keene, ‘More Presumptions Please’ (2015) Elder L J); E. Jackson, ‘From 
Doctor Knows Best to Dignity.’(2018) 81(2) MLR 247 which engages in some detail with Wye Valley. 
77
 [2013] UKSC 67, [45].  
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CoP judgments
78
 and has more recently evolved into the language of ‘standing in P’s shoes’79, another 
metaphor for empathetic judging.
80 
 These adjustments in emphasis can be taken to imply a 
recalibration of best interests decision making, countering the formulaic language of ‘checklists’ and 
‘balance sheets’ and endorsing a more wholistic approach. Echoing Lady Hale’s statement, Peter 
Jackson J had located the importance of his meeting with Mr B in ‘deepening understanding’ of Mr 
B’s ‘point of view’81 and it would certainly seem counterintuitive to exclude the direct voice of P, or 
access it only indirectly, when trying to ascertain what that point of view is.  A meeting with the 
judge, whether in private or giving information or evidence in open court, can therefore provide a 
means of ascertaining wishes and feelings, although it would rarely constitute the sole mechanism for 
this.
82
 Encouraging and facilitating meetings between the judge and P are therefore key to attaining 
the empathetic, ‘P-centric’ approach prescribed in Aintree, to realising the context of P’s wishes and 
feelings, and, accordingly, informing judgments about the appropriate weight to place on them in the 
individual case. But how frequently does P meet with the judge? 
3. (IN)VISIBILITY OF DIRECT ENGAGEMENT IN HEALTH & WELFARE DECISIONS 
FOR ADULTS 
Before exploring the prevalence of and impediments to direct engagement in the CoP (with a 
particular focus on meetings with the judge), some preliminary observations should be made. Beyond 
reported judgments, little accessible data exists on the prevalence of direct engagement. Giving 
evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the MCA in November 2013, one CoP judge 
                                                          
78
 E.g. in Wye Valley itself: incapacity is not an ‘off switch’ for P’s rights and freedoms, (n1), [11]. See also Biggs identifying a 
shift towards a compassionate person centred approach: ‘From dispassionate law to compassionate outcomes in health 
care law or not.’ (2017) 13(2) Int J of Law in Context. 172, 179. Whilst there is an emerging body of literature on the weight 
attached to P’s wishes and feelings in decisions as to what is in P’s ‘best interests’ that issue is outside the scope of this 
paper: see, however, A. Ruck Keene, above (n59) and  M. Donnelly, ‘Best Interests in the Mental Capacity Act: Time to say 
Goodbye?’ (2016) 24(3) Med L Rev 318. 
79
 Re P [2017] EWCOP B26; DM v Y City Council [2017] EWCOP 13; Cambridge v BF [2016] EWCOP 26, [22] ‘doing the best I 
can to put myself in her shoes’. 
80
 See S. Bandes, ‘Compassion and the Rule of Law.’ (2017) 13(2) Int J of Law in Context 184 at 185, defining empathy as not 
taking sides, but ‘a desire to see things from the vantage point of another – to try to understand what is at stake for the 
parties. 
81
 See above. 
82
 Professionals are usually tasked with informing the court of the wishes and feelings of the subject of proceedings (usually 
a CAFCASS Officer in the case of children, and a treating or independently appointed doctor, psychologist, IMCA 
(independent mental capacity advocate) or social worker in the case of P). Cf New Zealand where it is envisaged that the 
judge meeting the child will be the primary means of ascertaining wishes and feelings: J. Caldwell, (n13) at 57 and P. Tapp 
(n53). 
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thought that she had communicated directly with P in about ten per cent of cases.
83
 As most CoP cases 
are dealt with on the papers, rather than involving an oral hearing, this may suggest that an even 
smaller proportion of the whole CoP caseload involves any direct engagement with P.
84
 
Judgments can provide further insights into practices of direct engagement, but although the CoP was 
created by the MCA in 2005, published judgments were slow to materialise. By 2016 a more liberal 
policy on publication was in place
85
 and the British and Irish Legal Information Institute repository of 
judgments (bailii)
86
 was utilised by the author to compile a database of over 300 CoP judgments for 
the purposes of assessing post-MCA jurisprudence on a number of issues. There are, of course, 
methodological limitations to research which uses judgments as a lens through which to assess the 
dynamics of court proceedings. For example, a number of judgments concern emergency applications 
where the judge must produce a reasoned decision under extreme time constraints,
87
 and P’s 
engagement with the court may not therefore be reflected in the detail which in fact occurred.    
The author initially reviewed 326 CoP judgments from some of the earliest reported CoP judgments in 
2008 up to July 2017. Only 202 of these concerned the CoP’s health and welfare jurisdiction and there 
were at least 13 where it was clear that meeting P would not really have been relevant.
88
 A survey of 
the 189 remaining judgments reveals examples where the feasibility of P meeting the judge would 
have been obviously impeded by practical considerations. First, meaningful engagement in person 
may simply not be possible due to P having a disorder of consciousness. At least 17 cases in the 
database where identified where P was in a minimally conscious state, permanent vegetative state or 
was otherwise suffering from reduced consciousness.
89
 There were at least six cases involving 
emergency applications, usually involving a request to perform an emergency caesarean section, 
leaving insufficient time to arrange a meeting with P. Furthermore, in some instances, delay in getting 
                                                          
83
 http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/0fe8cea8-89db-453c-afb2-7a97d8b20db1 accessed 04/03/18. 
84
 L. Series, P. Fennell and J. Doughty (n7) p.98. 
85
 Practice Guidance (Transparency in the Court Of Protection) [2014] EWCOP B2, particularly para 16. 
86
 British and Irish Legal Information Institute - http://www.bailii.org.  
87
 For examples, see Re AA [2013] EWCOP 4378; Re SB [2013] EWCOP 1417. 
88
 E.g. where the judgment was concerned with reporting restrictions rather than the substantive health and welfare 
issues.  
89
 E.g. PS v LP [2013] EWCOP 1106 – P had suffered a cerebral aneurism resulting in participation not being possible – ‘it is 
uncertain whether she knows who or where she is’, [5]. 
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the case to court precludes direct engagement, because by then P’s health may have deteriorated to a 
point that they are not able to communicate.
90
 P’s mental impairment may be an impediment to such a 
meeting, for example cases of ‘severe learning disability’ or advanced dementia may mean that there 
is no purpose in a meeting with a judge and these features were possibly evident in up to 21 further 
cases. In one case the court sanctioned keeping the proceedings a secret from P (for example, for 
patients with persecutory delusions), which of course rules out meaningful participation
91
 and in 
another, it was expressly decided to be against P’s best interests to meet the judge because P was 
experiencing anxiety connected with the number of professionals coming to see her.
92
 Of the 
remaining 143 judgments, there were just twenty three where P had clearly been in direct 
communication with the judge (sixteen per cent). Of these examples, nine appear to involve P giving 
formal evidence in court
93, three showed P ‘giving information’ in court94 and eleven documented a 
meeting with the judge
95
. 
4. CLOSE TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF COP JUDGMENTS EVIDENCING MEETINGS WITH 
THE JUDGE 
This section uses the dataset of CoP judgments and ‘helpful parallels’ from Children Act proceedings 
to identify some of the potential practical and legal barriers to meetings with the judge and builds a 
case for further scrutiny of the legal impediments to meeting the decision maker. 
a) Practical impediments to direct engagement 
                                                          
90
 Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012] EWCOP 1639 – P was in a ‘drug haze’ at the time of the hearing due to strong 
sedative medication. 
91
 NHS Trust & Ors v FG [2014] EWCOP 30. Secrecy was upheld where P suffered from persecutory hallucinations, including 
believing that her doctors had murderous intentions.  
92
 A Local Health Board v AB [2015] EWCOP 31. 
93
 Y County Council v ZZ [2012] EWCOP B34; CC v KK [2012] EWCOP 2136; A NHS Trust v Dr. A [2013] EWCOP 2442; Re SB (A 
Patient; Capacity To Consent To Termination) [2013] EWCOP 1417; A Local Authority v TZ [2013] EWCOP 2322; X v A Local 
Authority & Anor [2014] EWCOP 29; GW v A Local Authority & Anor [2014] EWCOP 20; The Health Service Executive of 
Ireland v PA & Others [2015] EWCOP 38 (video link).  
94
 Re PB [2014] EWCOP 14; London Borough of Redbridge v G [2014] EWCOP 485; Re Z & Ors [2016] EWCOP 4; Lincolnshire 
CC v JK [2016] EWCOP 59. 
95
 Sandwell MBC v RG [2013] EWCOP 2373; Re M (Best Interests: Deprivation of Liberty) [2013] EWCOP 3456; Westminster 
City Council v Sykes [2014] EWCOP B9; A Local Authority v B [2014] EWCOP B21; London Borough of Islington v QR [2014] 
EWCOP 2; A Local Authority v M & Ors [2014] EWCOP 33; Wye Valley NHS Trust v B (Rev 1) [2015] EWCOP 60; Re CD [2015] 
EWCOP 74; Re W (Anorexia) [2016] EWCOP 13 (via video link); Newcastle Upon Tyne CC v TP [2016] EWCOP 61; Re QQ 
[2016]EWCOP 22. 
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Returning to the question of why, in a substantial majority (more than 80 per cent) of the cases 
surveyed, P had not appeared in person or otherwise communicated directly with the judge, this data 
needs to be further contextualised. The above analysis suggests there were 120 cases in the dataset 
where it is not possible to say from the judgment exactly why there appears to have been no encounter 
between P and the judge. It may have been because P preferred not to meet the judge because of the 
psychological demands of talking to a judge, appearing in court and/or giving evidence. Few 
vulnerable people would willingly expose themselves to the scrutiny of the court without some 
trepidation.
96
 P’s condition and/or their situation may mean that they experience problems in 
articulating their thought processes clearly, and this may magnify the ‘fear factor’ of attending or 
participating in court. It is notable, for example, that in Re DD, P chose not to co-operate with the 
process at all,
97
 and in A NHS foundation Trust v Ms X, P had expressed the wish not to be in contact 
with the judge, even via telephone, or to otherwise be part of the process.
98
 Even if health permits, the 
physical demands of travelling to/appearing in court may be problematic and may be contingent upon 
resources and professionals/carers being able to commit the time to accompany P in what can be 
lengthy proceedings.
99
 The judgments also indicate that in a small number of cases, a lack of planning 
is responsible for P not being heard in the CoP.
100
  
Many of these difficulties may mean that a meeting with the judge as happened in, as happened in 
Wye Valley, is the most attractive and practical option for enabling P to tell her story directly to the 
decision maker (although even then, this may not be possible). Practical impediments aside, the law 
has generated other uncertainties which may cumulatively explain why meetings between the judge 
and P have up to now been relatively rare. 
b) Legal impediments to meetings with the judge: the risk of ‘contaminating’ the evidence 
                                                          
96
 If they do, they may be subjected to ‘hours of cross examination’: GW v A Local Authority & Anor [2014] EWCOP 
20. 
97
 The Mental Health Trust & Anor v DD & Anor [2014] EWCOP 11. 
98
 [2014] EWCOP 35.  
99
 Re SB [2013] EWCOP 1417 – P’s ability to give direct evidence was attributed in part to the efforts of her medical team.  
100
 There are numerous examples of judges chastising NHS Trusts for not bringing matters to the Court’s attention more 
promptly: A Local Authority v K [2013] EWHC 242 (COP); NHS Trust & Ors v FG [2014] EWCOP 30; AB v Sandwell [2014] 
EWCOP 23, [39]. 
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Practitioners and academics have queried whether the forensic/non-forensic distinction applied in the 
Family Court has the same traction in the CoP.
101
 In guidance and jurisprudence connected with the 
CoP the forensic/non-forensic distinction is seldom referenced, and in the few instances where it 
appears, it is in the context of precluding a meeting with P. For example, in Norfolk CC v PB
102
 Parker 
J recorded her reluctance to accede to a request to meet P at the hearing, stressing that ‘care has to be 
taken as to how a meeting shall be treated.’103 If the meeting was to take place in the presence of the 
judge alone and without the opportunity to test ‘the evidence’, no conclusions of fact could be drawn 
from it. The judge had clearly assumed that the practices of the Family Court applied in equal 
measure to the CoP on this issue. YLA v PM, also decided by Mrs Justice Parker, records that a 
request on P’s behalf to meet the judge was denied.104 The application concerned whether a 37 year 
old vulnerable adult could choose to remain with her husband and baby, or needed to live in 
residential care away from her family. Placing a clear premium on direct engagement, the Official 
Solicitor requested that the judge meet with P ‘because ‘reading [PM’s] stated wishes and feelings is 
perhaps a poor substitute for the court’s ability to acquire more direct, first-hand experience of [PM] 
and her situation.’105  
 
The initial application was, however, rejected on the grounds that the judge felt she was being invited 
to make an assessment of the strength of P’s wishes and feelings ‘and indeed capacity.’106 Justice 
Parker clearly regarded a meeting touching on either of these issues as potentially breaching the 
‘gathering evidence’ rule. The approach of this particular judge further supports suggestions that some 
judges will find it impossible to avoid forming impressions which could influence their view of the 
evidence.
107
 Having said that, arguably YLA raised particular concerns because the judge regarded 
capacity as uncertain at that point in proceedings. An alternative means of dealing with this would 
have been to meet with P and, if the judge regarded the meeting as having any bearing on P’s 
                                                          
101
 E.g. V. Butler Cole and L. Hobey-Hamsher, ‘The assessment of capacity by judges in the Court of Protection.’ (2016) 2 
Elder L J 1 and Facilitating the Participation of P and Vulnerable Persons in Court of Protection Proceedings 2016.  
102
 [2014] EWCOP 14.  
103
 Ibid [42]. 
104
 YLA v PM [2013] EWCOP 4020. 
105
 Ibid [32]. 
106
 Ibid [34]. 
107
 See below. 
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capacity, she could have ordered further reports or requested P to give evidence or information on her 
capacity in open court. 
Is the forensic/non-forensic distinction observed in the CoP? 
The Norfolk and YLA judgments are fairly exceptional in their explicit assumption that the gathering 
evidence rule applies equally to meetings with the judge in the CoP, and this is probably explained by 
the fact that they were decided by the same judge whose decision had been appealed in Re KP. Aside 
from these judgments, evidence on the applicability of the rule in the CoP context is inconclusive. On 
the one hand, it might be argued that the distinction is to be implied, as CoP guidance refers to the 
importance of agreeing the ‘purposes’ of such a meeting in each individual case,108 and the guidance 
also devotes separate sections to ‘meeting with the judge,’ ‘P giving information to the Court’ and ‘P 
giving evidence.’109 Similarly, in the recent case of AB the non-forensic/evidence gathering distinction 
is not referred to, but ‘participation’ is again stratified, with ‘a relatively low-level meeting with the 
judge’ being treated as distinct from ‘giving information or evidence.’110  
On the other hand, none of these sources directly clarifies whether the forensic/non-forensic 
distinction has any application to P’s meetings with the judge in the CoP. Compounding this 
uncertainty, the CoP guidance is expressly ‘not prescriptive’111, there are no higher court decisions on 
the matter and the jurisprudence of the CoP is, strictly speaking, of little precedential value.
112
 Rogers 
J in A County Council v AB remained elusive on the issue of whether jurisprudence from the Family 
Court could be applied in CoP cases. Referring to a 2016 Court of Appeal decision in Re E, he refused 
to apply it as a ‘precedent’, ‘template’ or ‘presumption of the judicial approach’ to be adopted in the 
CoP, but confined its import to being ‘of interest’ and a ‘useful indication’ of the modern approach to 
                                                          
108
 Facilitating the Participation of P and Vulnerable Persons in Court of Protection Proceedings  2016, [14]. 
109
 Ibid at [14-20]. 
110
 [2016] EWCOP 41, [48]. 
111
 [2016] EWCA Civ 473 – child giving evidence directly to the court in care proceedings.  
112
 See Biggs (n.78) highlighting the tendency of CoP judges to stress the highly individualistic nature of the decisions being 
made, tempering the norms of precedent. 
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‘participation’ in its broadest sense.113 This equivocal stance again leaves the applicability of Re KP to 
the CoP uncertain. 
If, for the moment, we assume that the forensic/non-forensic distinction has traction in the CoP, can 
we say that CoP practice has been to observe the distinction? Series et al reported in 2016 that judges 
in the CoP had effectively gathered evidence from meetings with P when the other parties did not 
seem to be present.
114
 No cases were cited in support of this observation, but the report continued by 
stating that this approach would not be palatable for those who ‘transpose the logic of judicial 
meetings with children onto the CoP’s practices and procedures for meeting P’.115 An analysis of CoP 
judgments certainly reveals some judicial narratives which apparently conflict with the gathering 
evidence rule, or which at least do not subscribe to the idea of an impermeable firewall between 
meetings with P and the rest of the case. For example, as stated in the opening section of this paper, 
Justice Peter Jackson in the Wye Valley case had said; ‘I did not feel able to reach a conclusion 
without meeting Mr B myself.’116 This wording envisages the meeting as being potentially decisive, 
as having a bearing on the outcome and therefore clearly as having forensic value. In the later case of 
Re CD the judge, commenting on Wye Valley, said ‘Mr Justice Jackson met Mr B and it is obvious 
from his judgment that the encounter was critically valuable.’117 This reflection on the Wye Valley 
judgment again suggests a perception at least that the meeting had an impact on the outcome – how 
else could it be ‘critically valuable’? These judgments might be taken to suggest that the judge is 
taking a more pragmatic view of these meetings and does not regard the ‘firm line’ in Family Court 
cases as necessarily being transferable to CoP judgments. Uncertainty regarding the traction of the 
gathering evidence rule in the CoP and conflicting narratives regarding whether meeting P can and 
should be kept separate from the grounds of the decision can only add to any judicial reticence to 
meet P. 
5. DISCUSSION: SHOULD THE COP MIRROR THE FAMILY COURT EXPERIENCE?  
                                                          
113
 [2016] EWCOP 41, [56]. 
114
 L. Series et al (n7), 101. 
115
 Ibid. 
116
 [2015] EWCOP 60, [18]. 
117
 [2015] EWCOP 74, [31]. 
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The issue of how far the CoP should mirror Family Court practice on judges meeting children is 
unresolved. It seems, however, from the above that uncertainty regarding the constraints of the 
adversarial process operates as a potential barrier to meetings with the judge. It is argued below that 
the CoP should take a deliberate step away from the Family Court approach, as that approach is based 
on a fiction, creates tensions with the two stages of CoP proceedings, and is at odds with a jurisdiction 
which is increasingly recognised as inquisitorial:  
a) The premise of the ‘gathering evidence’ rule is built on a fiction  
The premise of the gathering evidence rule, with its distinction between forensic and non-forensic 
settings, is built on a myth; namely the assumption that an impermeable barrier can be maintained 
between a meeting with P and the ‘evidence’ on which the case is decided. It is doubtful that judges 
can ‘compartmentalise’ information so that those things which the judge comes to know through the 
accepted channels of ‘evidence’ can be brought to bear on the decision, but those other things learned 
about P (e.g. in an informal meeting) can be prevented from influencing the decision. There is an 
impressive body of psychological research which challenges the notion that jurors can, on instruction, 
disregard ‘inadmissible’ evidence that they have just heard.118 Some research with mock jurors even 
suggests that paradoxically, ‘refraining from thinking unwanted thoughts is so difficult that it can 
produce an ironic process’ whereby ‘more attention is given to the thing they are supposed to 
ignore.’119 But, it might be argued that whilst a lay person may struggle with the mental challenge of 
‘cordoning off’ information when making a decision, this ability is within the competence of an 
experienced judge. Empirical research by Wistrich et al suggested, however, that judges too found it 
difficult to ignore what they knew.
120
  Speaking extra-judicially, Baroness Hale appeared to recognise 
that a strict divide between forensic and non-forensic functions in meetings with the child was 
‘unrealistic’: 
                                                          
118
 See e.g. J, Lieberman & J. Arndt, ‘Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for 
the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence’ (2000) 6 Psychol Pub Pol’y & L 
677; D. Wegner, ‘Ironic Processes of Mental Control’, (1994) 101 Psychol Rev, 34; and D. Wegner & R. Erber, ‘The 
Hyperaccessibility of Suppressed Thoughts’, (1992) 63 J Personality & Soc Psychol 903. 
119
 A. Wistrich et al, ‘Can judges ignore inadmissible information?’ The difficulty of deliberately disregarding.’ (2005) Uni of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1251 at 1262.  
120
 Ibid.  
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‘I sometimes learned something I did not already know. And I felt better able to predict how 
things would go in the future, for better or for worse. It may not have changed the decision I 
was going to make, but it certainly made it easier to make it.’121 
These meetings are not meant to elicit new evidence, but it is hard to see how learning something you 
‘do not already know’ does not alter the evidence base for the decision.  
The fiction that judges can somehow hermetically ‘seal off’ the information they have obtained 
through the channels of ‘evidence,’ from extraneous information is compounded by a secondary 
fiction employed in appeal judgments from Family Court decisions. Where a decision has been 
appealed on the grounds that the judge ‘gathered evidence’ from their meeting with the child, the 
appeal court in effect tolerates the meetings generating new information as long as the judge has 
provided a convincing account that it has not changed their decision.  Much appears to depend upon 
the judge’s own account of whether the meeting has influenced the outcome and mostly, these appeals 
fail.
122
 In Re A, for example, irregularities in the meeting were excused on the ground that the judge 
had emphasised that his meeting with the children in the case ‘had not been determinative and that he 
had simply taken it into account as something which accorded with his preliminary view that the 
children were telling the truth.’123 But how can a judge be sure about what has or has not influenced 
them? Parkinson and Cashmore’s research with Australian judges reported some skepticism about 
being able to avoid meetings with the child becoming (imperceptibly) forensic:  
‘How do you divide in your own mind what’s influencing you?...I can’t help but be gleaning 
things. I won’t even know how I’m using those, it might even be the language the child 
uses…the demeanour…’124 
                                                          
121
 Baroness Hale, Can You Hear Me Your Honour? Hershman/Levy Memorial Lecture, 2011 (available at 
www.alc.org.uk/...you_hear_me,_Your_Honour._Memorial_lecture_2011.pdf) (emphasis added). 
122
 See e.g. Re N-A [2017] EWCA Civ 230. 
123
 Re A (Fact Finding Hearing: Judge meeting with Child)[2012] EWCA Civ 185: ‘I saw Jo not for the purposes of gathering 
evidence, nor do I attribute to myself any skill with children that is of forensic value… I deal with it at this part of the 
judgment to make clear the fact that I had not come to my final decisions but had formed a view before I saw Jo. (per His 
Honour Justice Richardson) At [95-97] of his judgment, replicated here at [33] (emphasis added). 
124
 P. Parkinson and J. Cashmore, (n13), 184. 
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Just as it is unlikely to be feasible for decision makers to insulate their decision from the meeting with 
P/the child, it is implausible that decision makers can be certain that the meeting has not influenced 
the outcome. These observations are echoes of Jerome Frank’s famous assertion that ‘justice is what 
the judge ate for breakfast’.125 We know that extraneous factors can and do affect judicial decision 
making, often subliminally,
126
 but the final judgment must maintain the façade that the decision is 
entirely a product of what the law accepts as ‘evidence’, which is narrowly defined.  If we accept that 
the gathering evidence rule is based on a fiction, we should consider moderating its use if it impedes 
P’s direct engagement in their own case.  
b) The ‘gathering evidence’ rule and the two stages of CoP proceedings 
The spectre of the gathering evidence rule creates acute difficulties when we seek to apply the rule to 
the ‘two stages’ of CoP proceedings outlined above (the ‘capacity’ stage and the ‘best interests’ 
stage). A meeting may result in the judge coming away with a distinct impression of P which was not 
part of the evidence submitted in open court. For example, speaking of his meeting with P, the judge 
in Re CD said: ‘…the person I met was different in many respects to the person described in the 
papers.’127 The court had been asked whether surgery to remove large ovarian growths was lawful in a 
case where P suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and referred to the growths at various times as a 
‘baby’ and a ‘spiritual lump.’128 On meeting P in hospital, Mostyn J observed her to be a ‘world away’ 
and ‘very unlike’ the ‘violent sociopath’ she was presented as in the papers.129 This echoes the 
sentiment of Peter Jackson J in Wye Valley where he also contrasts the person he met with the picture 
of him as presented in the files.
130
 According to Family Court jurisprudence, forming altered 
impressions of P does not breach the ‘gathering evidence’ rule.131 However, a real difficulty for CoP 
cases, is that a meeting with P can affect not just the judge’s ‘impressions’ of P, but also the closely 
related issue of P’s mental capacity.  
                                                          
125
 J. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind. (Stevens, 1949) reprint of original version (Coward-McCann, 1930), 40. 
126
 E.g. S. Danziger et al, ‘Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions.’ (2011) PNAS 6889.and A.Kosinski, ‘What I ate for 
breakfast and other mysteries of judicial decision making.’ (1993) 26 Loyola LA Law Review 993. 
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 [2015] EWCOP 74, [31].  
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 Ibid.  
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 Ibid., [31]. 
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 Which does not breach the ‘gathering evidence’ rule in family cases according to Re N-A [2017] EWCA Civ 230, [30]. 
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Capacity is a matter on which expert evidence will be submitted and which is, of course, a 
fundamental issue of fact in CoP cases, for a lack of capacity is a prerequisite of the CoP’s 
jurisdiction.
132
 In Norfolk CC v PB Justice Parker had expressed particular concerns around drawing 
conclusions with respect to P’s capacity from the meeting.133 A line seems to be drawn between 
allowing the meeting with P to influence decisions regarding P’s capacity and decisions regarding 
best interests/P’s wishes and feelings, the former being a judicial taboo. It is perhaps no coincidence 
then that the judges in Re CD and Wye Valley appear to have met with P once a conclusion had been 
reached regarding P’s capacity, that part of the proceedings having been ‘boxed off’.134 This is likely a 
result of assumptions that the meeting with P should only affect decisions on best interests.  
As compared with issues of capacity, there seems to be a consensus that material gleaned from P 
regarding their wishes and feelings in so far as they are relevant to their best interests, is a proper use 
of a meeting with P. Thorpe LJ in Re A regarded this as ‘safer ground’ and confirmed the 
appropriateness of a judge meeting with a child where the judge wished to ‘ascertain for himself the 
strength of the child’s wishes and feelings,’135 and perhaps ‘what has contributed to the formation of 
those wishes and feelings.’136 The 2013 CoP judgment in Re M mirrored this approach and confined 
the relevance of such meetings as being helpful in informing the judge of P’s wishes.137 But even in 
the realms of the place of P’s wishes in assessing their best interests, there can be what appear to be 
issues of fact at stake. The judge in Wye Valley speaking of his meeting with P appeared to be using 
that information to make an assessment of the ‘authenticity’ of P’s expressed wishes, that is, in the 
context of this case, whether they were a product of P’s bipolar disorder:  
‘All this was said with great seriousness, and in saying it Mr B did not appear to be showing 
florid psychiatric symptoms or to be unduly affected by toxic infection.’138  
                                                          
132
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All of this further underlines the ‘blurry’ boundary between forensic and non-forensic details – 
information regarding the strength of P’s wishes and feelings or the authenticity of those wishes can 
surely be described as matters of fact, as could the content of those wishes and feelings, and therefore 
findings on these matters could theoretically change the outcome of the decision. Wye Valley appears 
to contradict itself on this point. The functions of a meeting with P spelled out above echo the ‘non-
instrumental’ objectives of judges meeting children as set out in the guidelines. They are about 
providing P with the opportunity to express themselves and being helped to feel a part of proceedings, 
without giving those meetings any potency. However, expert evidence on Mr B’s best interests was 
divided and it does seem that the meeting was pivotal in swaying the judge against an enforced 
amputation. 
c) The detrimental impact of reserving meetings until after capacity has been determined 
One of the safeguards recommended for meetings between children and the judge is to suggest that 
the meeting only takes place towards the end of proceedings, once a judgment has already been 
reached or drafted, but not delivered.
139
 This provides a way in which the judge’s decision could at 
least in theory be insulated from what Wistrich calls ‘mental contamination,’ the unconscious 
cognitive process by which information already stored influences how we process new stimulti: 
‘People might not even realise how new information affected their judgment and are thus ill equipped 
to contain its influence.’140 As we have seen, the device of postponing meetings with P seems to have 
been employed in some CoP cases, with the meeting being deferred at least until the issue of capacity 
has been determined.  
However, postponing meetings until proceedings are nearly at a close, or at least until capacity issues 
are determined, compromises putting P at the heart of proceedings. Specifically, it risks any process 
of direct engagement becoming a cursory, tokenistic exercise. As Justice McDonald observed in the 
2016 case of Ciccone v Richie, the child’s participation should be experienced as a ‘moving picture’ 
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rather than a ‘still photograph.’141 Clearly the benefits of meeting P, and affording real voice and 
validation would be easier to realise without artificial restrictions on when those meetings should take 
place.  
d) Strict adherence to adversarial norms should be questioned in an increasingly inquisitorial 
court 
Our common law system of adjudication is undoubtedly adversarial in nature. It is built on an ‘age old 
consensus’ that facts are to be proved by evidence and the ‘gold standard’ for testing the reliability of 
that evidence is the ‘crucible of cross examination.’142 Despite the proximity of the CoP jurisdiction to 
the Family Court experience outlined above, there are important distinctions to be made here. Whilst 
there have been moves to temper the corrosive effects of adversarial combat on children and parents, 
the Family Court continues to employ an adversarial mode of hearings
143
, albeit with adjustments to 
the forensic process which import a distinctly ‘inquisitorial’ flavour. 144 Child protection cases heard 
in the Family Court may often raise serious allegations, and in these cases, the rights of those accused 
are integral to those proceedings. These rights include the right to a fair hearing which incorporates a 
right to have evidence against them interrogated by cross-examination.
145
 Even outside of child 
protection work, many Family Court cases are bound to be fairly adversarial in nature. Although they 
may ostensibly be about the best interests of the child, they are frequently framed as a dispute 
between parents as to where the child should reside and under what terms they should have contact 
with each parent.  
By contrast, fact finding hearings in the CoP are rare and the CoP’s jurisdiction is sometimes referred 
to as ‘inquisitorial’.146 Most of the CoP’s work is non-contentious and even when it does deal with 
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contentious cases, the nature of the court’s inquiry does not sit well with the idea of an adversarial 
contest between two sides. The court’s purpose is to discover whether P has capacity, and if not, what 
would be in P’s best interests and it is assumed that parties are seeking the best outcome for P – there 
are no ‘winners and losers’ in CoP proceedings as there are in personal injury litigation, for 
example.
147
 Particularly when it comes to the court’s investigation of what would be in P’s best 
interests, the role of  the judge in seeking to put themselves in P’s shoes might be seen as more akin to 
an inquisitorial decision maker who does indeed, subject to procedural safeguards (such as making 
that evidence available to the parties), gather their own evidence.
148
 It is accepted that in the context of 
unconscious patient for whom a decision must be made, the court should ‘seek as many narrative 
threads as possible’ to ascertain P’s perspective149, but that means that when P is not suffering a 
disorder of consciousness, the most important ‘thread’ for ascertaining that perspective is to hear from 
P directly. 
Part of the CoP’s inquisitorial alignments are set out in the MCA itself and show that in certain 
circumstances the court does indeed ‘gather evidence’. Under s.49 the Court has the power to 
‘require’ oral or written reports from the Office of the Public Guardian, CoP Visitors, or from any 
NHS body or local authority on any issue ‘relating to P’ as the court may direct, including an 
assessment on P’s capacity.150 An analysis of the judgments sees CoP Visitors being mentioned 
frequently in the context of financial and property matters, but only rarely in health and welfare cases. 
Nevertheless, there are a few examples of the court using this power to flex its inquisitorial muscles. 
For example, in Re RS, the CoP asserted its power under s.49 to commission a report from a Health 
Trust on P’s capacity,151 and in Re NRA, Charles J highlighted the potential of s.49 to assist the court 
in fulfilling its investigatory functions
152
 in relation to deprivation of liberty cases where there was no 
litigation friend. The nature of the CoP’s jurisdiction leaves it free to develop more inquisitorial 
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practices and gives it cause to question some of the deeply entrenched adversarial norms, such as the 
rule against gathering evidence, which hold sway in other courts. 
 
e)  The Family Court model does not recognise a presumption in favour of direct engagement 
It is perhaps rare that the legal position for children should lead the way for adults, rather than the 
other way around, but that seems to have been the case here. Re W and its non-presumptive balancing 
exercise have become the starting point for dialogue around issues of participation in both the Family 
Court and CoP.
153
 When the issue of P’s attendance at CoP hearings was raised recently in A County 
Council v AB, the judgment demonstrated real willingness to facilitate P’s participation, noting the 
Court’s ability to hear information from P was ‘wide and flexible’ and that CoP rules did provide for 
an ‘entitlement to attend’.154 On the issue of giving ‘information,’ appearing to mirror the non-
presumptive stance of Re W, Rogers J in AB stated: ‘it is nevertheless a balance. There is no 
presumption, but there seems to be good reason in this case why it is worth having a try and keeping 
the matter under review.’155 Likewise, the Guidelines on Facilitating Participation of P and 
Vulnerable Persons in CoP Proceedings regard ‘meeting the judge’ as a means of encouraging 
participation, and require that P’s views should be sought ‘at an early stage’ on whether they wish to 
attend court or meet with the judge,
156
 but they are non-prescriptive on the issue of whether the 
meeting should happen.
157
  
This non presumptive approach is an obstacle to realising the perspective taking, empathetic approach 
to CoP judging envisaged in Aintree. Presumptions are valuable devices for legal ‘nudging’; they 
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‘exist to foster the functions of the law’158 and it seems clear that if there is a commitment to 
promoting increased direct engagement between P and the court, a legal presumption would be one 
way to support this commitment. Rules which impede P’s direct engagement with the court when P 
wishes it to happen, should be subject to close scrutiny. Likewise, the assumption that the CoP ought 
to follow in the Family Court’s footsteps is highly questionable here. The right to make our own 
decisions and the right to have our views given weight are far more heavily qualified in the case of 
children and ‘standing in the subject’s shoes’ has not emerged as a key focus for best interests 
decision making for children in the same way as it has for adults. If the CoP follows practices 
developed in the Family Courts too readily, there is an obvious risk of getting locked into a potentially 
regressive mutually reinforcing cycle.   
 
6. CONCLUSION : THE LIMITS OF FOLLOWING THE PROXIMATE JURISPRUDENCE 
OF THE FAMILY COURT 
Whilst there is an abundance of research internationally dedicated to the intricacies of judges meeting 
children in family court settings, and a significant body of domestic case law has emerged on the 
subject and has tested its limits, the practices of judges meeting P in the CoP are under-explored, and 
case law is minimal. This paper has highlighted that although the therapeutic gains of enabling the 
subject of litigation to tell their story directly to the decision maker are broadly accepted, it is unclear 
whether the narrow ‘non-instrumental’ model of participation applied to judges meeting children, 
applies equally to P’s meetings with the judge in the CoP.  The pale, reticent language of s.4(4)’s 
‘permitting’ P’s participation, certainly appears to fall short of a right or presumption in favour of a 
direct voice in best interests decisions. 
The post-Aintree emphasis on P’s ‘point of view’ in best interests jurisprudence is mere empty 
rhetoric, if that point of view is obscured by being theoretically or structurally excluded from 
engaging directly with the decision maker. The limited evidence available suggests that in health and 
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welfare cases (where there has been no obvious reason P not to engage directly with the judge) that 
engagement has happened in less than twenty per cent of cases. It should not, however, be assumed 
that the rarity of this happening is necessarily due to a fundamental unwillingness to facilitate P’s 
participation. Many practical impediments to such engagement are evidenced in the judgments, and it 
is outside the scope of this article to suggest how the impact of these (e.g. delay) might be minimised. 
On the specific issue of judges meeting privately with P, a survey of the judgments suggests, however, 
that the spectre of the gathering evidence rule (as applied to judges meeting children) may well have 
played a part in deterring such meetings from taking place.  
 Caldwell observed that the ‘culture of the court system will be highly influential’ in determining the 
extent to which judges meet with children.
159
 In the CoP this culture is made up of, not only the 
judiciary and their clerks, but also the Official Solicitor and lawyers (many of whom have substantial 
experience of family law cases) who frame the case in the courtroom. Although the jurisdictional and 
cultural proximity of these jurisdictions has resulted in a tendency to model CoP practices on 
procedures adopted in relation to children, there are compelling reasons to rethink matters when it 
comes to judges meeting with P. The ‘gathering evidence’ rule is built in part upon a fiction that 
judges can cordon off certain information when making their decisions. Whilst the fiction may have 
value in supporting adversarial norms, its application should not be over-extended. Further, 
application of the rule to the two stages of CoP proceedings creates its own complications which tend 
to obscure the meaningful engagement of P by postponing meetings with the judge until a late stage in 
the process.
160
 The gathering evidence rule and its distinction between meetings for forensic vs non 
forensic purposes may make sense in a highly adversarial context, but it conflicts with the mode of 
CoP hearings which is distinctly inquisitorial and seeks to look at things from P’s ‘point of view’. The 
strenuous efforts undertaken to understand P’s values and preferences through the conduit of friends 
and family when P is currently unconscious
161
, make it even more anomalous that P has not routinely 
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met with the judge when they are fully conscious. The author agrees with Birchley that in the context 
of unconscious patients, the court should ‘seek as many narrative threads as possible’ to ascertain P’s 
perspective
162
, but that means that when P is not suffering a disorder of consciousness, the most 
important ‘thread’ for ascertaining that perspective is to hear from P directly.   
It has been argued here that if P wishes to meet the judge, or indeed, give evidence in their own case, 
the non-presumptive model from Family Court jurisprudence should be departed from; the starting 
point should be that they would be allowed to do so, unless the presumption is rebutted by convincing 
evidence of potential harm. This may very well emerge from future practice in the CoP, but we are far 
from a definitive statement on the matter. 
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